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Public Diplomacy: Functions, 




It is common practice when evaluating the effect of public diplomacy to associ-
ate it with soft power. This chapter challenges this view. It holds that, rather than 
turning soft power resources into soft power, the fundamental function of public 
diplomacy is to transform a country’s assets into soft power resources that will 
attract the target country. This chapter also shows that although public diplomacy 
performs such functions, it is not necessarily effective, especially in ‘high politics’ 
such as territorial security. But even where its effectiveness can be exerted, public 
diplomacy is subject to other distractions. Therefore, in order to measure accurately 
the real effect of public diplomacy, it is necessary to exclude the potential influence 
of these interfering variables by strengthening the rigor of research design.
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1. Introduction
To regard the accurate evaluation of the effect of public diplomacy work as the 
most important research topic for public diplomacy scholars is not overstating the 
case. Clearly, unless we make an accurate assessment of past work, it will be dif-
ficult to determine whether or not current working ideas and methods are correct, 
whether or not certain policy proposals aimed at improving the effectiveness of 
public diplomacy will work, and in which public diplomacy areas or projects to 
increase investment in the future. In this sense, the empirical measurement and 
scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of ‘public diplomacy’—a research area 
that is highly policy- and practice-related—should be the primary and most critical 
topic of research in this regard as a whole. However, to make an accurate assess-
ment of public diplomacy, it is necessary to define theoretically its function, utility 
boundary and measurement method.
This chapter holds that public diplomacy’s most important function is to trans-
form a country’s general assets into soft power resources, which refer to those assets 
that people of other countries like or support and which are therefore attractive to 
them. In other words, the function of public diplomacy is to reverse the attitude of 
people in other countries towards the assets (such as a certain culture, set of values 
or policies) of the implementing country from not knowing, liking or supporting 
them to the opposite. Therefore, the success of a public diplomacy effort is assessed 
according to whether or not it improves or enhances the public of target country’s 
evaluation of a particular aspect of the implementing country.
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However, owing to certain functional boundaries, public diplomacy does 
not work in all problem areas. In ‘high-politics’ such as territorial security, for 
instance, public diplomacy is likely to be of little use. But even in fields where 
public diplomacy can play a role, factors such as changes in power structure, dif-
ferences in political systems and the quality of political relations among countries 
will still have impact on its effectiveness. The ultimate purpose of clarifying the 
function and functional boundaries of public diplomacy, therefore, is to mea-
sure more accurately its effect. This chapter further proposes that there are two 
main methods in this regard: one is the sampling survey method that is aimed at 
the general public, namely, the public opinion poll, and the other is that of the 
unstructured interview with a small specific group of people. Both methods have 
their advantages. As regards their practical application, however, certain matters 
demand attention.
This chapter is divided into four parts as follows. The first part discusses the 
definition and functions of public diplomacy on the basis of combing through and 
criticizing the existing viewpoints, thus to clarify the judgment criteria of the effect 
of public diplomacy. The second part discusses the functional boundaries of public 
diplomacy and points out the disturbance variables that affect its actual effect. 
On the basis of the first two parts, the third part discusses two empirical methods 
through which to measure the effect of public diplomacy and the problems to which 
attention should be paid in this regard. The fourth part is the conclusion.
2. Definition and functions of public diplomacy
Scholars have yet to form a unified understanding of the definition of the term 
‘public diplomacy’ since it was first proposed in 1965. At present, there are still dis-
cussions in this field on ‘traditional public diplomacy’ and ‘new public diplomacy’. 
It is now believed that, since the turn of the twenty-first century, public diplomacy 
has shown signs of transition and transformation from the former to the latter. New 
public diplomacy, a horizontal mode with multiple actors characterized by com-
munication and cooperation, is version 2.0. It is an upgraded version of traditional 
public diplomacy, which is a hierarchical mode of information dissemination 
centred on the government [1–7].
Although there are many cognitive differences between the two, with the 
deepening of research, scholars have reached a certain degree of consensus on the 
connotation of public diplomacy in the following aspects. The first is with regard 
to implementation, wherein the government plays an indispensable and irreplace-
able role. Even through the eyes of advocates of new public diplomacy, and their 
embrace of other implementing bodies such as NGOs and the general public, there 
is no difference between them and scholars of traditional public diplomacy as to the 
issue of the government as initiator and important promoter.
In fact, no matter how far public diplomacy develops in the networking direc-
tion, the nature of its diplomacy does not change at all. As a specific branch of 
diplomacy, the representativeness of sovereign states, which is closely related to 
the government, is its essential attribute. The second aspect is the object, or object 
of implementation, where targeting the people is recognized as the core difference 
between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. Third is the means of imple-
mentation, where cultural exchanges and media communication are regarded as the 
main means of promotion. According to these consensuses, therefore, public diplo-
macy can be defined as a diplomatic activity wherein the government is the initia-
tor, the public is the object, and relevant policy measures, including foreign policy, 
are introduced through cultural exchanges, media publicity and other means.
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Having clarified the definition of public diplomacy, we need to make clear its 
functions, as it is only when we know what public diplomacy should and can do that 
we can determine, according to this criterion, whether or not it is effective. At pres-
ent, academic discussions on the effect of public diplomacy generally associate it 
with the concept of ‘soft power’ as proposed by Nye [8–12], and tend to take the size 
of a country’s soft power as the core measure through which to evaluate the effect 
of its public diplomacy [13–17]. In order to define more clearly and reasonably the 
function of public diplomacy, this part will critically refer to Nye’s theory when 
clarifying the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power.
The first problem when discussing ‘soft power’ is how to define the concept. 
To better understand how Nye defines and discusses soft power, we must first 
clarify how the more fundamental concept of power is defined. In the field of 
international relations, there are two ways to define ‘power’. One is the ‘power-as-
resources’ approach, which treats power as an asset and attribute inherent in the 
state, with emphasis on the material resources needed to constitute it. The other is 
the ‘relational power’ approach, which emphasizes the impact of power on human 
behaviour [18].
Based on the ‘relational power’ approach, Dahl gave a classic definition that is 
widely accepted and cited in the field of international relations: The so-called power 
is the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would otherwise not do [19]. 
The ‘power-as-resources’ approach defines ‘power’ as what we now commonly refer 
to as ‘capability’, while the ‘relational power’ approach emphasizes the effect of the 
‘power’ of one actor on the behaviour of other actors.
According to Nye’s definition of soft power, it is the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment [11]. Or, more specifically, ‘soft 
power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the 
agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes’ [12]. Obviously, Nye’s definition of soft power follows the ‘relational 
power’ approach. What he calls ‘soft power’ emphasizes the influence of one actor, 
rather than of the resources he owns, on the behaviour of another actor.
Nye points out that the common ground between ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ 
is that whereby both kinds of power can change the behaviour of other countries. 
The difference between them consists in bringing about this change in different 
ways. Soft power works through attraction, and hard power through coercion 
or inducement. The reason why one country may have the ‘soft’ power through 
‘attraction’ to change the behaviour of other countries lies in the assets this country 
possesses that are attractive to other countries. Nye calls this kind of asset a ‘soft 
power resource’ [9].
In short, Nye’s ‘soft power’ actually corresponds to the ‘power’ of the ‘relational 
power’ approach. What he called ‘soft power resources’ corresponds to ‘power’ 
as defined by the ‘power-as-resources’ approach, also commonly referred to as 
‘capability’. In this sense, ‘soft power resources’ can also be called ‘soft capability’. 
The relationship between (soft/hard) capability and (soft/hard) power is shown in 
Figure 1.
It is obvious that a soft power resource is the material premise of soft power. 
Nye points out that the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: 
its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it 
lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen 
as legitimate and having moral authority) [9]. Public diplomacy plays an important 
role in the process of transforming soft power resources into soft power.
Governments (and sometimes not just governments) engage in public diplo-
macy by using their own soft power resources to attract other countries and form 
soft power. For example, ‘Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention 
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to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, 
arranging exchanges, and so forth’. However, using unappealing resources (that 
is, non-soft power resources) to carry out public diplomacy will not create soft 
power and may produce the opposite result. For example, ‘Exporting Hollywood 
films full of nudity and violence to conservative Muslim countries may produce 
repulsion’ [11].
In sum, Nye’s theory presents a process chain from assets to soft power resources 
and then to soft power. Based on this theory, the function of public diplomacy is to 
transform soft power resources into soft power, that is, to use soft power resources 
to change other countries’ behaviour by attracting other countries’ publics 
(Figure 2).
Nye’s contribution to the study of public diplomacy lies in his creative integra-
tion of public diplomacy and his theory of soft power, which provides a theoretical 
framework for the analysis and study of public diplomacy and important enlighten-
ment for us to define the function of public diplomacy.
However, Nye’s specific views on the relationship between public diplomacy and 
soft power are debatable. To be specific, as Nye placed public diplomacy in step ② 
as shown in Figure 2, other scholars have therefore defined the function of public 
diplomacy as ‘transforming soft power resources into soft power’. In the author’s 
view, this point is difficult to establish. The definition of public diplomacy deter-
mines that it can only appear in step ① and not in step ②.
Step ② refers to the transformation of ‘soft power resources’ into ‘soft power’. 
The process entails the target country making policies or exhibiting behaviour 
favourable to another country because the target public likes and supports certain 
of that country’s assets. The action mechanism here is as follows. The direct reason 
why the government of a target country will support the country with soft power 
lies in its need to maintain the stability of its own regime. When the domestic 
public of the target country has an extremely positive attitude towards the source 
country of the soft power, the stability of that regime will face great pressure from 
the domestic public should the target country’s government blindly adopt negative 
policies. This is Audience cost theory [20–22].
Figure 1. 
The relationship between (soft/hard) capability and (soft/hard) power.
Figure 2. 
Nye’s relation between public diplomacy and soft power.
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But the problem is that, whether according to the definition of public diplo-
macy or the actual work of public diplomacy carried out by every country, public 
diplomacy will not get involved in this step at all. A core difference between public 
diplomacy and other forms of diplomacy is that the direct object of public diplo-
macy is the people, rather than governments, of other countries.
In fact, as a diplomatic practice, public diplomacy is generated and exists based 
on the assumption that the attitude of the people of a country will influence the 
policies of the government. Thus, as a supplement to traditional diplomacy, and also 
as distinct from traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy only focuses on changes of 
public attitudes in the target country, whose people it is that exert pressure on their 
government to change its attitude. By definition, once a country’s diplomatic work 
involves direct contact with other governments, it will be classified as traditional 
diplomacy, or government diplomacy, instead of public diplomacy. In this sense, 
as long as it is public diplomacy, it cannot appear in step ②. Empirically speaking, 
therefore, the actual practice of public diplomacy in countries throughout the world 
is limited to work that targets the public of other countries.
Step ① refers to the process of transformation from ‘assets’ to ‘soft power 
resources’. According to Nye’s definition, ‘soft power resources’ refer to those assets 
that the public of other countries likes or supports, and which are therefore attrac-
tive to them. Assets (such as a certain culture, political values or policy) themselves 
will not change. The reason why assets can transform into ‘soft power resources’ is 
that the public opinion of other countries towards these assets changes from ‘not 
knowing’ and ‘not liking’ to ‘knowing’ and ‘liking’. Thus, the transformation from 
‘assets’ into ‘soft power resources’ is, in fact, the change of attitude of the public 
of other countries towards certain of the implementing country’s ‘assets’. Such a 
change in attitude is exactly what public diplomacy, with the public as the imple-
menting object, should and can achieve.
To be specific, the countries implementing public diplomacy can clarify and 
explain their policy positions through various information channels, such as infor-
mation release and international broadcasting. They may thus prove to the peoples 
of target countries the legitimacy of their policies through information campaigns 
and personnel exchanges which demonstrate that their values are the same at home 
and abroad. Through cultural exchanges and other activities, these countries can 
also enable the people of target countries to learn more about implementing their 
culture, thus creating conditions for the production of attractive effects. In short, 
public diplomacy can turn assets that are not ‘soft power resources’ into new soft 
power resources.
In a nutshell, public diplomacy itself only involves interaction with other coun-
tries’ publics; interaction with other countries’ governments is not included. This 
determines that public diplomacy can work only in Step ① rather than Step ②.
In addition, if the function of public diplomacy is to change the behaviour of 
the government of the target country, then such a function lacks particularity. The 
ultimate goal of all diplomacy is to pursue changes in the behaviour of the target 
government. As just one of many diplomatic tasks, however, public diplomacy obvi-
ously needs its own unique goals and functions. If the function of public diplomacy 
also includes achieving a change in the behaviour of the target country’s govern-
ment, then, as a subclass of diplomacy, public diplomacy becomes indistinguishable 
from other subclasses of diplomacy, which negates the need for it to exist in its own 
right. From the perspective of the uniqueness of diplomatic work, therefore, the 
function of public diplomacy should be distinct from that of traditional diplomacy.
To conclude, the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power is not, 
as Nye believes, to transform soft power resources into soft power, but to transform 
general assets into soft power resources (Figure 3).
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Since the function of public diplomacy is to create soft power resources, and soft 
power resources refer to those assets that are accepted or favoured by the people of 
the target country, the success of a public diplomacy project is judged according to 
whether or not it improves or enhances the people of the target country’s evaluation 
of one aspect of the implementing country. In other words, what we actually mea-
sure is whether or not public diplomacy expands a country’s soft power resources.
3. Functional boundaries and influencing factors of public diplomacy
Given that the basic function of public diplomacy is to create soft power 
resources, could it also play a role in all problem areas by changing the perception 
or evaluation of the people of target countries? And if such restricted areas do exist, 
can the function of public diplomacy be fully realized in areas where it could play a 
role? The answer to all of these questions is clearly no. This is the utility boundary, 
and possible influencing factor of public diplomacy.
First, public diplomacy is likely to be of little use in the ‘high politics’ of ter-
ritorial security. Whether the public diplomacy of the US in the Middle East since 
the turn of the twenty-first century or the publicity of the Chinese and Japanese 
governments against each other’s people in recent years with regard to the Diaoyu 
Islands issue, the effect is not ideal. Obviously, it is not due to the US’s public 
diplomacy work that people in the Middle East do not recognize the legitimacy of 
the US’s invasion and interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, or even Libya, and nor do 
the Chinese and Japanese people object to the territorial claims of their own govern-
ments due to the publicity work of the other government.
This reminds us that communication and mutual trust are ineffective when it 
comes to territorial security, especially territorial disputes, where one party gains 
a zero-sum conflict at the expense of the other. It will be difficult to persuade 
their people to accept ‘legitimate’ interference in their territory and to give up 
their claims to territory and rights no matter how convincingly countries tell their 
own stories. Public diplomacy is of little use, therefore, when it comes to the ‘high 
politics’ of territorial security.
Second, in the field where public diplomacy could play a role, its effect will still 
be affected by the following factors. The first is the inevitable structural contradic-
tion between a country’s rising power and that of other countries. The negative 
impact of this factor on the effect of public diplomacy is typified by China’s public 
diplomacy towards Japan. Global View 2008 surveys taken in Chicago showed that 
the Japanese had the lowest level of favourable views on China, behind those of 
South Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam. 89% of Japanese respondents said they were 
either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ uncomfortable with the idea of China’s 1 day becoming 
the leader of Asia [14].
The key reason lies in the semi-structured interviews with Dinnie and Lio. 
When asked, ‘What are the key challenges facing China in its attempts to build a 
positive reputation within Japan?’, one Japanese journalist interviewee admitted, 
Figure 3. 
Author’s relation between public diplomacy and soft power.
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‘The Japanese people and their elected representatives, sensitive to China’s growing 
strength and acutely aware of Japan’s deficiencies, are unnerved by China’s growing 
power and Japan’s economic dependence on China’. Another interviewee, a director 
of one of Japan’s cultural and political institutes, agreed that there was ‘fear in Japan 
of China getting bigger and Japan smaller, that’s the heart of the matter. It’s hard for 
China to deal with this’ [23].
The second factor is that of differences in political systems. It is in China’s public 
diplomacy towards Europe that this factor has the most obviously negative impact. 
According to Dutch scholar d’Hooghe, Europe is deeply concerned about China’s 
domestic conditions; much more so, it appears, than the United States. China’s 
high favourability rating in Europe at the beginning of this decade rapidly declined 
after 2006. ‘China-hype’ has gradually transmuted into fear of a rising China and 
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of China’s political reform and human rights 
situation [15].
Jhee’s research also confirms the existence of national prejudice [14], which 
shows that people’s evaluation of a country’s political system is largely irrational. 
People tend to like a particular political system not because it works, but simply 
because their ideology and values align with it. On the other hand, cost-benefit 
considerations make it impossible for an executive to change his or her regime just 
to ‘please’ the people of the target country. This means that it is neither possible 
for China to change its own political system voluntarily nor to win the favour of 
Western people by demonstrating the effectiveness (superiority) of its own political 
system. In this sense, it is difficult to avoid completely the negative impact of the 
difference in political system on the public goodwill of the target country—that is, 
on the effect of public diplomacy.
The third factor is political relations between countries. A study the author 
conducted on the empirical evaluation of the effects of China’s public diplomacy in 
six countries made clear that this factor has significantly influenced the public of 
the United States and of the United Kingdom’s evaluation of China, but in differ-
ent directions [24]. China-US relations have a negative impact on the favourable 
opinion of the American people towards China. The more positive China-US rela-
tions become, the less favourable the US public will feel towards China. Meanwhile, 
the political relationship between China and the UK has a positive impact on 
the favourable opinion of the British people towards China. Further research is 
undoubtedly needed as to why bilateral political relations should have such oppo-
site effects. However, with regard to the issue of the effect of public diplomacy as 
subordinate to that of the level of political and security relations, this should be 
relatively certain.
All of the above variables are likely to influence (either drag down or improve) 
to varying degrees the goodwill of people in the target country towards the imple-
menting country. Therefore, when these variables coexist with the public diplo-
macy activities themselves, we cannot assess whether or not the public diplomacy 
conducted towards the country is effective based simply on the decline or increase 
of favourable opinion, but need to control as far as possible the influence of these 
interfering variables through rigorous research design.
4. Measurement of the effect of public diplomacy
If defining the function and effect evaluation criteria of public diplomacy is to 
define ‘what to measure’, then we need also to know what methods are needed to mea-
sure the effect of public diplomacy, that is, ‘the measuring tools’, and how to measure 
the effect of public diplomacy through these methods, that is, ‘how to measure’. There 
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are two main empirical methods of measuring the effect of public diplomacy: one 
is the sampling survey method, which is aimed at the general public, namely, the 
public opinion poll; the other is the unstructured interview with a small group of 
specific people. The non-structured interview, also known as the non-standardized 
interview, is either a semi-controlled or uncontrolled interview, which can be divided 
into four types: intensive interview, in-depth interview, objective statement, and 
symposium [25].
The public opinion poll method and the interview method are two common 
widely used empirical methods in modern social science research on which there 
have been many methodological works with regard to their design procedure and 
implementation steps in the general sense, but which are not discussed in this 
chapter. The author’s specific concern is: when using these two methods to measure 
the effect of public diplomacy, which problems need to be resolved to ensure the 
accuracy of the measured results? In this regard, there are at least three aspects 
worth discussing.
First, who should be chosen for the investigation? Whether a public opinion poll 
or an interview, the first question involves the selection of respondents. The author’s 
opinion is: pinpoint the direct audience of public diplomacy and extract from this 
group (as far as possible) the respondents through which to measure its effect. 
This is because the fundamental purpose of our survey is to see whether or not the 
people of the target country have changed their attitude towards a certain aspect of 
the implementing country due to a specific public diplomacy project on the part of 
the implementing country, rather than a general change in attitude.
Imagine country A conducting public diplomacy through the medium of 
international students there from country B. After a period of time, we want to 
know whether or not country A’s public diplomacy activity has been effective, so 
we conduct questionnaires or interviews with workers in country B. In this case, 
even if the survey results show that workers in country B have never heard of 
such public diplomacy as conducted by country A, we should not consider it to be 
invalid, because country B’s international students in country A may be much more 
familiar with such public diplomacy. Similarly, even if the survey results show that 
the attitude of workers in country B towards country A has improved, we should 
not assume that the public diplomacy aimed at international students from country 
B has been effective, because it is possible that the attitude of country B’s interna-
tional students in country A has deteriorated.
For example, the aforementioned interview study on the effect of China’s public 
diplomacy on Japan is flawed to some extent as regards its design, as discussed here 
[23]. The two academics asked seven interviewees: ‘What effect, if any, do you 
think the establishment of Confucius Institutes in Japan has had on China’s reputa-
tion?” Obviously, the best and most convincing way of finding out whether or not 
establishing a Confucius institute in Japan will improve China’s reputation is to ask 
Japanese students who are studying or who have studied at Confucius institutes in 
Japan. However, the article clearly identified the seven respondents, none of whom 
were or had been students at a Confucius institute in Japan. Claiming that China’s 
public diplomacy efforts to promote Confucius institutes in Japan are ineffective, 
therefore, even though all respondents in the group said that they had not noticed 
or were only slightly aware of the existence of Confucius institutes, is both futile 
and unconvincing.
Second, which of the two methods of polling and interviewing should be 
chosen? As regards public opinion polling, it has the advantage of rapidly afford-
ing an understanding of the views of respondents on certain issues and timely 
reflecting changes in public opinion. At the same time, survey results can infer the 
general situation as a whole, so achieving high representativeness. The advantage of 
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the non-structured interview lies in its great flexibility, which gives full play to the 
enthusiasm of both interviewers and interviewees. The two sides can have in-depth, 
extensive conversations and discussions on relevant issues, events, and phenom-
ena, from history to current events, from causes to effects, from motivations to 
behaviours, and from individuals to others and major social environments on given 
topics, so obtaining rich data that is not forthcoming from structured interviews 
and opinion polls.
In view of the characteristics and advantages of the two methods, whether to 
choose one or both of them for a specific study should be based on the research 
question and the desired final results of empirical measurement. If researchers want 
only to know which public diplomacy activities, or specific aspects of an activity, 
have had a positive effect and which have not, then polling is the preferred method. 
If researchers want to know the reasons for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a 
public diplomacy activity, or the actual psychological reaction of the activity target, 
they should consider the interview method. And if you want to understand both, it 
is best to combine the two methods.
Third, with regard to the interpretation and evaluation of the data, we must 
focus on the crucial matter of the potential impact of interference variables.
One potential dispute is that of whether measuring the effect of something 
requires excluding the effect of the interfering variable. Those who are extremely 
optimistic or who place great expectations on the functioning of public diplomacy 
may put forward the extreme view that public diplomacy must produce the desired 
change in the attitudes of the people of the target country despite the presence of 
other disturbing variables, such as those mentioned above, in order for us to con-
sider it effective. Is that a reasonable view? Let us imagine another scenario: how do 
we determine whether or not the cooling function of an air conditioner is effective? 
One view is that assessing the cooling effect of air conditioning requires excluding 
all other factors that affect the temperature. According to this view, it is only when 
the doors and windows are closed, there is no direct sunlight or heat source in the 
room, all other possible variables remain unchanged and the indoor temperature 
drops a certain value (for example, 3°C) after the air conditioner has been on for a 
certain period of time (such as 10 min) that we can consider this air conditioning 
refrigeration as ‘effective’.
Another view is that assessing the cooling effect of an air conditioner does not 
require controlling for the effects of other interfering variables. According to this 
view, whether or not the doors and windows are closed, there is direct sunlight or 
a heat source in the room, or there are other potential interference variables, and 
no matter how long the air conditioning has been on, the indoor temperature must 
drop 3°C before we can consider the air conditioning refrigeration as ‘effective’.
Obviously, in real life even the pickiest consumer buying an air conditioner 
would not make such high demands of the manufacturer as listed in the second 
view above with regard to its refrigeration effect. That being the case, there is no 
reason to expect public diplomacy to be effective in the presence of interfering 
variables. In other words, it makes sense to say that a country’s public diplomacy 
towards a country is effective (or ineffective) only when the influence of other 
interfering variables is excluded. For example, we try to measure the effect of public 
diplomacy through public opinion poll data, which may be influenced by factors 
other than public diplomacy. Therefore, the interpretation and evaluation of these 
data must take into account the potential influence of interference variables.
When analysing the trend of the effect of public diplomacy over a period of 
time, the inflection point of poll data is often an important empirical basis for 
scholars to analyse any change in its effect. At the same time, however, it is at the 
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analysing the inflection point, we should not judge whether a country’s public 
diplomacy becomes effective or ineffective based solely on the data trend ensuing 
from it. Instead, we should focus on whether are not there are other interference 
factors at or before the inflection point that may affect the poll data.
5. Conclusion
Compared with the traditional inter-governmental diplomacy, the subjects 
and objects of public diplomacy are more extensive, the specific diplomatic forms 
more diverse, and the implementation period of some forms of public diplomacy is 
longer. These are the characteristics of public diplomacy that determine our need 
to strengthen the evaluation of its implementation effect in the process of carrying 
it out, thus to timely adjust the direction and implementation of public diplomacy 
strategies, reduce resource waste, and improve diplomatic efficiency. Effective 
evaluation of the effect of public diplomacy requires a determination of the evalu-
ation criteria. The most common practice today is to associate the effects of public 
diplomacy with soft power, whereby the evaluation of a country’s public diplomacy 
is based on whether a country’s soft power towards other countries has improved. 
This chapter challenges that view and holds that the basic function of public diplo-
macy is to transform the assets of a country into soft power resources that attract 
the target country, rather than turning soft power resources into soft power, as 
mentioned by Joseph Nye. In other words, the success of a public diplomacy effort is 
judged by whether or not it improves or enhances the public of the target country’s 
evaluation of the implementing country.
When evaluating the effectiveness of a country’s public diplomacy, we should 
also avoid making excessive demands of it. For instance, public diplomacy is proba-
bly of little use in the ‘high politics’ of territorial security. Even in fields where public 
diplomacy can play a role, the power competition between countries, differences 
in political systems, quality of political relations, and other factors will lower the 
target country’s evaluation of the implementing country. In carrying out empirical 
research, we should carefully control for these interfering variables and avoid mis-
calculating the actual effect of public diplomacy. Therefore, researchers should focus 
on improving their research design in order to make empirical evaluation results 
more reliable. Rigorous empirical research is the most powerful guarantee of consis-
tent pinpointing and rectifying of problems arising in public diplomacy practice.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
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